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Two hundred million people live abroad, roughly three percent of the
world's population.' Most seek better economic opportunities; migration
generally flows toward developed countries. While many foreigners are
assimilated seamlessly into their new homes, others face a less hearty
welcome. Global displacements have bred xenophobia, a complex
*

Fellow, China Law Center, Yale Law School. I appreciate the comments of Profes-

sor Veronica Taylor and the other participants at the Japanese Studies Association of Australia
Conference (Australian National University), the Julius Stone Centenary Conference (University of Sydney), and the Annual Meeting of the Law and Society Association (Humboldt
University).
1.
Adam Roberts, Open Up: A Special Report on Migration, ECONOMIST, Jan. 5, 2008,
at 4.
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phenomenon with various manifestations: violence, mockery, and
exclusion are unfortunately all too common reactions to visibly alien
visages.
Approximately two million foreigners currently reside in Japan, a
fourfold increase from 1991. While Japanese xenophobia eschews the
violence of its western counterparts, it is no less palpable. Its guises include housing discrimination, ejection from stores, employment
discrimination, and exclusion from private establishments, public facilities, clubs, organizations, and financial services. These, at least, are the
forms of xenophobia that have been the subject of litigation in Japan.
A landmark 1998 decision, rendered by the Shizuoka District Court,
has emboldened many foreigners to file their own racial discrimination
lawsuits.2 Many have won damage awards from Japanese individuals,
stores, and public facilities. Most plaintiffs are from the United States,
although this trend is not an American imposition.3 Brazilian, Chinese,
German, Indian, and Korean plaintiffs have also filed racial discrimination lawsuits.4 By examining successful and unsuccessful cases brought
in Japanese courts, this Essay adumbrates the lines of "tolerable" racial
practices in Japan. Under what circumstances, to employ the standards
of the Japanese judicial system, is discrimination reasonable?
These cases form part of a larger debate unfolding in both Japan and
the rest of the world. Namely, what is the role of law in proscribing discrimination? Should racial discrimination fall within the purview of
national (or local) legislation? Or, is the judiciary primarily responsible?
Since the United States passed the Civil Rights Act of 1964, numerous
countries have followed suit. The United Kingdom, European Union,
Australia, and, most recently, Hong Kong have all passed laws to ban
some forms of racial discrimination in the private sphere.6
The Japanese Diet has twice tried to pass similar legislation. A third
attempt is unlikely, leaving the issue for other political actors to solve.
The Japanese judiciary has stepped in to define these limits, I argue, by
melding international and domestic law. Where legislators have tried and
2.
Bortz v. Suzuki, 1045 HANREI TAIMUZU 216 (Shizuoka D. Ct., Oct. 12, 1999).
3.
Many Japanese believe that the United States imposed the present Constitution on
Japan. Yasuo Hasebe, Constitutional Borrowing and Political Theory, I INT'L J. CONST. L.
224, 224 (2003) ("[T]he Constitution of Japan ...was not borrowed but rather imposed by the
occupying forces [of the United States] after the Second World War."); cf. Timothy Webster,
Note, Legal Excisions, 39 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 435, 437 (2006).
4.
See infra Part II.A.
5.
See Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1981-200h-6 (2000)).
6.
See, e.g., Race Discrimination Ordinance, (2008) Cap. 602 (H.K.) (implementation
pending); Council Directive 2000/43/EC, 2000 O.J. (L 180) (EC); Racial Discrimination Act,
1975, c. 9 (Austl.); Race Relations Act, 1976, c. 74 (Eng.).
7.
See infra Part IV.A.
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failed, judges now determine, one case at a time, where the boundaries
of permissible racial discrimination lie. This has led to some puzzling
decisions, of course, but on the whole the courts repeatedly rule against
discriminators.
This Essay proceeds in four parts. Part I situates these lawsuits in the
context of Japan's growing ethnic diversity. Part II analyzes a decade of
racial discrimination lawsuits in Japan, ultimately synthesizing the elements of a compensable act of racial discrimination under current
Japanese law. Part III begins with a brief examination of the role of international law in Japan before turning to discussions between the
Japanese government and U.N. bodies regarding the proper treatment of
foreigners in Japan and the desirability of anti-discrimination laws. Part
IV then discusses several failed attempts by national and local lawmakers to pass anti-discrimination legislation and ordinances. A brief
conclusion follows.
I.

JAPAN AND THE WORLD

Japan is slowly coming to grips with the reality of ethnic otherness
on its own turf. For centuries, Japan fancied itself a "closed nation" (sakoku). This introversion slowly eroded, however, in the late nineteenth
century, as Japan opened to the West. Nearer to home, Japan used its
military strength to colonize much of east and southeast Asia. At its territorial zenith, in the early 1940s, Japan occupied Taiwan, Korea,
Manchuria, and parts of mainland and island southeast Asia. Colonial
subjects became citizens of the Japanese empire, and-through cultural,
social, and linguistic practices-were expected to assimilate into the collective Japanese identity. With the end of World War II, Japan once again
returned to its insular ways, denaturalizing residents of the former colonies and rebuilding itself.
In the 1980s, Japan's economic success made it a particularly popular destination for immigrants. Since then, as increasing numbers of
foreigners move to Japan, their presence challenges the mythic homogeneity of Japan. Some Japanese accommodate ethno-racial difference
without incident. But others obdurately cling to the myth of ethnic singularity ("mono-myth"). The notion that Japan is culturally, ethnically, and
geographically distinct from the rest of humanity is called Nihonjinron,
or "theory of the Japanese people." This belief continues to hold sway in
Japan, and helps to fuel the chauvinism at least partially responsible for
many instances of xenophobia. To be sure, chauvinism has many names
8.

See John Lie, The Discourse of Japaneseness, in

JAPAN

&

FOREIGN WORKERS AND THE ADVENT OF A MULTICULTURAL SOCIETY

GLOBAL MIGRATION:

70, 85 (Mike Douglass
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and analogues throughout the world, and Japan is no different from other
countries in this regard.
What distinguishes Japan, however, is the length to which Japanese
and foreign critics have gone to propagate this myth. Particularly after
World War II, "the self-image of Japan as an island nation that contained
no aliens and was therefore peaceful and tranquil" took root. 9 As Japan's
economy and self-confidence grew in the 1970s, the popular media and
the academy took part in an "unprecedented boom in theories about the
Japanese."' Emphasis on the uniqueness of the Japanese reinforced the
idea that ethnic others, who did not fit into the domestic social agenda,
could be ignored, or alienated.
Nihonjinron is not just a construct of the popular imagination, but
has implications for law and policy as well. Take, for instance, the Immigration Control Act, which helped change the face of Japanese
unskilled labor." During the 1980s, migrants from Asia and South America went to Japan to perform unskilled labor. Rather than create a legal
status for the migrants, however, the Japanese Diet introduced penalties
against employers who hired illegal workers, as well as those who
helped employers to find such labor. 2
At the same time, the Act opened up two conduits for the importation of unskilled laborers.'3 First, an administrative order to implement
the Act permitted the children and grandchildren of Japanese citizensmost of whom live in South America"-the right to receive long-term
resident status in Japan.'5 This permitted hundreds of thousands of Japanese Latinos, primarily Brazilians, but also some Peruvians, the
& Glenda S. Roberts eds., 2000) ("The central conclusion and the fundamental assumption of
all Nihonjinron writings are that Japanese people and culture are different, even unique.").
9.
Eiji OGUMA, A GENEALOGY OF "JAPANESE" SELF-IMAGES 299 (David Askew trans.,
2002).
10.
Id. at 319.
11.
See Shutsunyflkoku Kanri Oyobi Nanmin Nintei H6 [Immigration Control and
Refugee Recognition Act], Cabinet Order No. 319 of 1951; see also Sumi Shin, Global Migration: The Impact of "Newcomers" on Japanese Immigration and Labor Systems, 19
BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 265, 279 (2001).
12.
Shin, supra note 11, at 279.
13.
See Chikako Kashiwazaki & Tsuneo Akaha, Japanese Immigration Policy:
Responding to Conflicting Pressures, MIGRATION INFO. SOURCE, Nov. 2006, http://
www.migrationinformation.org/Profiles/display.cfm?ID-487.
14.
See Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs [MOFA], Recommendations of Overseas
Emigration Council Future Policy Regarding Cooperation with Overseas Communities of
Nikkei, http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/enigraion/nikkei.html (last visited Nov. 14, 2008).
15.
Teijfisha kokuji (Heisei Ninen H6mush6 kokuji dai 132 g6) no Ichibu Kaisei ni
tsuite [A Partial Amendment to the Long-Term Resident Notification (Ministry of Justice
Notification 132 of 1990)], Ministry of Justice Notification 496 of 2005, an. 2(3), availableat
http://www.moj.go.jp/NYUKAN/HOUREI/h06.html (extending this privilege to the children
and grandchildren of Japanese citizens).
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opportunity to work for three-year stints in Japan. The Brazilian population in Japan consequently more than quintupled between 1990 and
2004.16
This policy further entrenched the mono-myth by limiting the number of ethnic others. Descendants of Japanese emigrants look Japanese
for all intents and purposes. And, since they rarely had the chance to
mingle with Japanese society, their different social, cultural, and linguistic habits did not often surface.
Second, a smaller number of "traineeships" opened up to foreigners
in fields such as agriculture, construction, machinery, and manufacturing, jobs considered undesirable by most Japanese.' 7 Other foreigners
have entered Japan under student visas or the more ambiguous "entertainer" visas, which encompass athletes, "dancers," musicians, and
prostitutes. 8 But, since many "trainees" and "entertainers" tend to live
on the margins of Japanese society, they do not often meaningfully interact with Japanese people.
Still, the number of foreigners increases. According to the Ministry

of Justice's 2006 figures,' 9 the largest group of foreign nationals in Japan
continues to be resident Koreans, at 598,000.0 Close behind are the Chinese, whose numbers in Japan more than doubled in a decade to
560,000.2' Given Japan's large diaspora population in the southern hemisphere,22 it is no surprise that the Brazilian population is the third largest,

16.
See Kashiwazaki & Akaha, supra note 13.
17.
Shutsunyflkoku Kanri Oyobi Nanmin Nintei H6 [Immigration Control and Refugee
Recognition Act], Cabinet Order No. 319 of 1951, app. tbl. 4; Kashiwazaki & Akaha, supra
note 13.
18.
See Kashiwazaki & Akaha, supra note 13.
19.
Press Release, Immigration Bureau, Ministry of Justice, Heisei jfhachi nenmatsu
genzai ni okeru gaikokujin t6rokusha t6kei ni tsuite [Statistics on foreign nationals registered
at the end of 2006] (2007), available at http://www.moj.go.jp/PRESS/070516-1 .pdf [hereinafter 2006 Statistics] (listing the number of foreigners living in Japan from 1997 to 2006); Press
Release, Immigration Bureau, Ministry of Justice, Heisei jfiroku nenmatsu genzai ni okeru
gaikokujin t6rokusha t6kei ni tsuite (gaiy6) [Statistics on foreign nationals registered at the
end of 2004 (OUTLINE)] (2005), available at http://www.moj.go.jp/PRESS/050617-1/050617l.html [hereinafter 2004 Statistics] (listing the number of foreigners living in Japan from 1996
to 2004).
20.
Although legally foreign, most resident Koreans are second- or third-generation
descendants of Koreans who were brought to Japan during the colonial period (1910-1945).
Most have lived in Japan for their entire lives, speak Japanese, and have little connection with
Korea. According to the 2006 statistics, they number roughly 600,000. 2006 Statistics, supra
note 19, at 3. In countries with less restrictive citizenship requirements, such as the United
States, most would be eligible for citizenship simply by being born in the country. See Immigration and Nationality Act § 301(a), 8. U.S.C. § 1401(a) (2000).
21.
2006 Statistics, supra note 19, at 3.
22.
See MOFA, supra note 14.
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at 312,000.23 Next are Filipinos (193,000), and then Peruvians (58,000).24
U.S. nationals rank sixth in total number of foreigners, at 51,000.2
The U.S. ranks first, however, in the number of racial discrimination
plaintiffs. 26 Perhaps due to an American predilection for litigation to resolve disputes, U.S. plaintiffs sue more frequently than other national
groups. While their cases are not always successful-just as those in the
United States-the concomitant jurisprudence has shed light on what
level of discrimination is permissible in contemporary Japan. At the
same time, it is important to realize that it is not just a case of ugly--or
litigious-Americans here. People from all over the globe experience
racism in Japan. This small subset has chosen the judiciary to hear their
case.
II.

RACIAL DISCRIMINATION IN JAPAN

A. Thesis: Impermissible Discrimination
Japanese expressions of racism are far more measured than their
counterparts in the United States, Europe, and Australia. They take any
number of forms, including "No Foreigners" signs (often in several languages to address the widest audience possible) and yelling racist
epithets. Subtler manifestations involve unwritten policies, such as regulating the number of foreign members in a given club. The more visible
the discrimination, the more likely a court will find the act illegal. But
this is not the sole factor. The success of a racial discrimination lawsuit
hinges almost exclusively on its provability, that is, the strength of the
evidence that the plaintiff musters in court.27
23.
2006 Statistics, supra note 19, at 6.
24.
Id.
25.
Id.
26.
There is no official source ranking the numbers of plaintiffs. My research reveals
five American plaintiffs: Arudou Debito (who subsequently became a naturalized citizen of
Japan), Kenneth Sutherland, Douglas Shukert, Steven Herman, and Steve McGowan. I have
discovered four Korean plaintiffs. See infra Part II.B (describing three plaintiffs in the golf
club cases); see also infra note 40 (describing the plaintiff in the Hitachi case). Furthermore, I
have come across two Indian plaintiffs, one Chinese plaintiff, and one Brazilian plaintiff.
27.
See, e.g., McGowan v. Narita, Wa No. 11926 (Osaka D. Ct., Jan. 30, 2006); Timothy Webster, Case Note and Commentary: McGowan v. Narita, 9 AUSTL. J. ASIAN L. 346
(2008) [hereinafter Webster, McGowan v. Narita]. In this case, an African-American male was
shooed away by a Japanese store employee who told him, inter alia, "I hate black people."
McGowan, Wa No. 11926, at 4; Webster, McGowan v. Narita, supra, at 346. The trial court
did not believe that the plaintiff understood Japanese well enough to understand such statements and dismissed his claim. McGowan, Wa No. 11926, at 7, 16; Webster, McGowan v.
Narita, supra, at 358. The appellate court overturned this decision, awarding the plaintiff
350,000 yen. See, e.g., Eric Johnston, Plaintiff Gets Redress, But Not for Racial Bias, JAPAN
TIMES, Oct. 19, 2006, available at http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/nn2006I019a4.html.
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Just as the acts vary, so too do the targets. Men and women have
filed suit. Plaintiffs of many ethnicities-European, EuropeanAmerican, African-American, Latino, Indian, Chinese, and resident Korean-have all sued for racial discrimination. As the following analysis
shows, even naturalized Japanese citizens-white and Asian---encounter
discrimination.
This Section first focuses on lawsuits in which foreigners 2 have won
monetary damages for acts of discrimination. In such instances, Japanese
courts have determined that the discriminatory conduct at issue is illegal.
Plaintiffs include (1) a Brazilian woman, 9 (2) three European-American
men (one of whom became a naturalized citizen of Japan), ° (3) an Indian man, 3' (4) an African-American man, 32 and (5) a naturalized
Japanese citizen of Chinese descent.33
The following Section will examine -lawsuits in which foreign plaintiffs have not won monetary compensation. The discrimination that they
14 35
35
encountered-in a bank,34 a golf club,
and an amateur sports league"was declared legal. In these cases, courts determined that the defendants
had a "rational" basis. The policy or action could very well be discriminatory, but the circumstances did not make it irrationally so. The
selection of these suits is dictated in large part by access. A review of the
publicly available case law permits reflection on a sufficiently broad
swath of behavior to differentiate between legal (or "rational") and illegal discrimination.
Throughout the cases, the International Convention on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (CERD) serves as a normative anchor."
Without a domestic law that covers private acts of racial discrimination,
Japanese courts indirectly apply international treaty law to fill the gap."

28.
Two of these plaintiffs were actually naturalized citizens. Their newly acquired
citizenship did not, however, shield them from discrimination.
29.
Bortz v. Suzuki, 1045 HANREI TAIMUZU 216 (Shizuoka D. Ct., Oct. 12, 1999).
30.
Arudou v. Earth Cure, 1150 HANREI TAImuzu 185 (Sapporo D. Ct., Nov. 11, 2002).
31.
Murthy v. Nikken Jfhan, Wa No. 2332, at 2 (Saitama D. Ct., Jan. 14, 2003).
32.
Johnston, supra note 27, at 1.
33.
Wa No. 14386 (Tokyo D. Ct., Sept. 16, 2004). Parties' names are unknown in this
case.
34.
Herman v. Asahi Bank, 1789 HANREI JIH6 96 (Tokyo D. Ct., Nov. 12, 2001).
35.
Hyon v. Chiba Country Club, 1773 HANREI JIH6 36 (Tokyo D. Ct., May 31, 2001),
aff'd 1773 HANREI JIH6 34 (Tokyo H. Ct., Jan. 31, 2002); Plaintiff v. Hachi6ji Country Club,
1043 HANREI JIH6 74 (Tokyo D. Ct., Sept. 9, 1981).
36.
Kenji Hall, Supreme Court Denies American's Demand to Open Japan'sNational
Sports Tourney to Foreigners,ASSOCIATED PREss, June 11, 2004 (on file with author).
37.
International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination,
Dec. 21, 1965, S. EXEC. Doc. C, 95-2 (1978), 660 U.N.T.S. 195 (entered into force for Japan
on Jan. 14, 1996) [hereinafter CERD].
38.
See infra notes 51-53 and accompanying text.
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International law provides the interpretive compass by which courts
draw the boundaries of unacceptable conduct.
1. Bortz v. Suzuki39
Although not the first foreigner to sue for discrimination, 4° Ana
Bortz nevertheless put racial discrimination on the map of Japanese jurisprudence.4 ' In 1998, the Brazilian reporter was ordered to leave a
jewelry store in Hamamatsu, a city of more than half a million people.
After the owner discovered that she was Brazilian, and not French as he
had assumed, he pointed to a sign in the store that said "foreigners are
strictly forbidden. 42 Bortz remonstrated with the owner, store employees, and local police that this behavior violated her human rights. 3 She
also summoned her colleagues from the foreign media, in the hopes that
external pressure would force the storeowners to capitulate. 4 When the
storeowners refused to apologize, Bortz sued.45 As no law specifically
prevented this kind of behavior, however, her decision to sue was fairly
remarkable.
Bortz won a hefty 1.5 million yen ($12,500) damages award.46 In a
discursive opinion, the Shizuoka District Court held that the storeowner's conduct constituted a tort ("illegal act") under Japanese law.47
The Japanese tort system requires compensation for infringement of a
person's rights.48 Since ejecting Bortz injured her basic human right to
39.
Bortz v. Suzuki, 1045 HANREI TAIMUZU 216 (Shizuoka D. Ct., Oct. 12, 1999).
40.
In 1970, Hitachi suspended an employment offer to a resident Korean who had
initially lied about his family background. The court specifically found that Hitachi acted with
"no apparent reason other than the factor of ethnic discrimination [minzokuteki sabetsu]" in

rescinding the contract.

IAN NEARY, HUMAN RIGHTS IN JAPAN, SOUTH KOREA AND TAIWAN

46-47 (2002). This, however, was ethnic discrimination and not racial discrimination per se.
See id. at 46-47. More recently, but before Japan ratified CERD, Indian plaintiff Kama Sinha
sued Mitsubishi for racial discrimination. See C.T. Mahabharat, Indian Engineer Sues Mitsubishi, NEWSBYTES PM, Mar. 26, 1993 (on file with author). He charged Mitsubishi with job
discrimination and sued for $40,000 in damages. Id. It is not known how the case resolved.
See Bortz, 1045 HANREI TAiMUZU at 216; Timothy Webster, Bortz v. Suzuki: A
41.
Translation and Introduction, 16 PAC. RIM L. & POL'Y J. 631 (2007) [hereinafter Webster,
Bortz v. Suzuki]. References to the Bortz case will cite to the official reporter and to the translation contained in the Pacific Rim Law & Policy Journalarticle.
Bortz, 1045 HANREI TAIMUZU at 217; Webster, Bortz v. Suzuki, supra note 41, at 633.
42.
Bortz, 1045 HANREI TAIMUZU at 217; Webster, Bortz v. Suzuki, supra note 41, at 634.
43.
Bortz, 1045 HANREI TAIMUZU at 217; Webster, Bortz v. Suzuki, supra note 41, at
44.
633-34.
45.
Bortz, 1045 HANREi TAiMuZu at 218; Webster, Bortz v. Suzuki, supra note 41, at 634.
46.
Bortz, 1045 HANRmi TAIMUZU at 231; Webster, Bortz v. Suzuki, supra note 41, at 652.
47.
Bortz, 1045 HANREi TAiMUZU at 231; Webster, Bortz v. Suzuki, supra note 41, at 652.
48.
See MINP6, art. 709 ("A person who violates intentionally or negligently the right of
another is bound to make compensation for damage arising therefrom."); id. art. 710 ("A person liable for damages under the provisions of the preceding Article must also compensate for
damages other than those to property, regardless of whether the body, liberty, reputation or

Fall 2008]

Reconstituting JapaneseLaw

"dignity and honor,' 49 the court determined that the jeweler was liable to
Bortz for the mental anguish that he had caused. 0
In arriving at this conclusion, the court pointed out that CERD could
fill the legislative gap left by the Japanese government: "[I]f an act of
racial discrimination violated a provision of CERD, and the [Sitate or
organization did not take the measures that it should have, then one
could, in accordance with Article 6 of CERD, at the very least seek
compensation for damages ...due to the omission."5' Furthermore, if the
government would not implement legislation banning discrimination, the
"text of CERD should be used as the interpretative standard" in determining what kind of behavior is illegal.52 In this way, Judge Soh Tetsuro
bypassed Japanese law and reached out to international law.
The judgment led to the first tort of racial discrimination in Japanese
law53 and the largest damages award for racial discrimination to this
day. 4 Important for present purposes, the decision also inspired other
foreigners to avail themselves of Japanese courts to vindicate human
rights abuses. The Bortz decision offers an important, although not binding, precedent for similarly aggrieved foreigners. 5

property rights of others have been infringed."). The court found violations of both provisions
and ordered compensation accordingly. See Bortz, 1045 HANREI TAImUZU at 231; Webster,
Bortz v. Suzuki, supra note 41, at 666.
49.
Bortz, 1045 HANREI TAimuzu at 231; Webster, Bortz v. Suzuki, supra note 41, at 666.
50.
Bortz, 1045 HANREI TAIMUZU at 231; Webster, Bortz v. Suzuki, supra note 41, at 666.
51.
Bortz, 1045 HANREi TAiMUZu at 225; Webster, Bortz v. Suzuki, supra note 41, at 652.
52.
Bortz, 1045 HANREI TAIMUZU at 225; Webster, Bortz v. Suzuki, supra note 41, at 652.
53.
Bortz, 1045 HANREI TAIMUZU at 220; Webster, Bortz v. Suzuki, supra note 41, at
640-41 ("In the courts, there have been no verdicts holding purely private acts of racial discrimination illegal.").
54.
By contrast, subsequent plaintiffs in racial discrimination suits received far less.
Arudou Debito received 1 million yen in damages, while Steve McGowan received less than
one third of Bortz's award (and only after appealing). See infra notes 55, 110 and accompanying text.
55.
Various foreign plaintiffs have noted that the Bortz verdict catalyzed their own
decision to sue. See, e.g., ARUDOU DEBITO, JAPANIIZU ONRII: OTARU ONSEN NYOYOKU
KYOHI MONDAI TO JINSHU SABETSU [JAPANESE ONLY: THE ISSUE OF REFUSING ENTRANCE

TO OTARU HOT SPRINGS AND RACIAL DISCRIMINATION] 47 (2003); Cultural Discrimination:
Foreigners Bannedfrom the National Sports Festival, An Interview with Douglas Shukert, Z
MAGAZINE ONLINE (on file with author) (describing how a U.S. hockey player sued an
amateur sports association that prevented his participation in a national hockey festival after
reading "an article on the Ana Bortz case"); Peter Hadfield, Japan's Foreigners Fight
Back Against Widespread Bias: They Say They're Denied Access to Loans, Baths, Bars,
USA TODAY, Mar. 8, 2000, at A24 (noting that Steve Herman was "inspired" to sue Asahi
Bank after hearing about the Bortz verdict).
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2. Arudou v. Yunohana Bathhouse56

Given her connections to the foreign media, the Bortz decision made
ripples in Japan and abroad, including on the front page of The New York
Times. 7 In Japan, one of many foreigners who heard about the case was
self-styled human rights activist Arudou Debito (ne David Aldwinckle).
Arudou has engaged in his own quixotic campaign against racial discrimination in Japan for over a decade. In the late 1990s, he tilted against
several bathhouses in northern Japan that had posted "No Foreigners" or
"Japanese Only" signs on their doors."' The attention generated by his
attempted "walk-ins" led at least two bathhouses to remove their signs
and renounce their exclusionary policies.59 One bathhouse that did not,
however, found itself in a legal imbroglio that Arudou pursued all the
way to the Supreme Court of Japan.6°
Arudou twice attempted to enter the Yunohana bathhouse, located in
the coastal town of Otaru. On September 19, 1999, he convened a multinational group of seventeen people of various nationalities (United
States, Chinese, German, and Japanese) to enter the bathhouse. 6' Although he and another white man were denied entrance, a Chinese
woman was permitted to enter. 62 Moreover, the manager permitted the
more "Asian-looking" of his two biracial daughters into the premises,
but not the more "Caucasian-looking" one. 63 The bathhouse operators did
not strictly construe their "Japanese Only" sign.

56.
Arudou v. Earth Cure, 1150 HANREI TAIMUZU 185 (Sapporo D. Ct., Nov. 11, 2002).
57.
See Howard W. French, "Japanese Only" Policy Takes Body Blow in Court, N.Y.
TIMES, NOV. 15, 1999, atAl.
58.
The bathhouses first posted these signs in response to customers' complaints about
unruly-and frequently inebriated-Russian sailors, whose antics in the baths upset other
clientele. Arudou, 1150 HANREI TAIMUZU at 187. The categorical ban on foreigners proved
effective, in the short term, to eliminate such behavior, but the Sapporo District Court determined that the ban was too broad in its application. Arudou, 1150 HANREI TAIMuZU at 194;
see also infra note 71 and accompanying text.
59.
Arudou Debito, "Gaikokujin" ny~iten kinshi to iu jinshu sabetsu [Racial discrimination based on denying 'foreigners" entrance into stores], in NIHON NO MINZOKU SABETSU:
JINSHU 8ABETSu TEPPAI J6YAKU KARA MITA KADAI [JAPAN'S ETHNIC DISCRIMINATION:

IS-

CERD] 218, 219 (Okamoto Masataka ed., 2005) (noting that the Otaru
Spa and Panorama Bathhouse took down their signs in 2000 and 1999, respectively).
60.
See Arudou, 1150 HANREI TAIMUZu at 185; Timothy Webster, Arudou v. Earth
Cure Judgmentof November 11, 2002 Sapporo District Court Translation, 9 ASIAN-PAC. L. &
POL'Y J. 297 (2008) [hereinafter Webster, Arudou v. Earth Cure]; Top Court Dismisses Appeal
in Bathhouse'sRejection of Foreigners,Kyooo NEWS INT'L, Apr. 7, 2005 (on file with author)
(describing Supreme Court's rejection of plaintiff's appeal). As with the Bortz decision, references to this case will cite to both the English translation and to the Japanese original.
61.
ARUDOU, supra note 55, at 23-24.
62.
Id. at 28.
63.
Id.
SUES DERIVING FROM

Reconstituting JapaneseLaw

Fall 2008]

In 2000, Arudou took Japanese citizenship and once again tried to
enter the bathhouse on October 31, 2000.64 He was once again refused.
Although he tendered proof of his Japanese citizenship, the store manager told him that his foreign appearance had not changed; other
customers would not understand that he was a citizen of Japan, so he
must be denied entrance. Together with two other white men who had
also been refused entrance at Yunohana, Arudou filed a lawsuit. He sued
the bathhouse for its openly discriminatory policy, and the Otaru municipal government for not passing an ordinance to ban racial
discrimination.65

The Sapporo District Court was responsive to the first claim, but not
to the second.66 As for the bathhouse's policy and repeated refusals of
foreigners, the court held that, in "light of the meaning of Article 14(1)
of the [Japanese] Constitution,67 Article 26 of the [International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) 6 ], and CERD, these [acts] amount
to private acts of racial discrimination that ought to be eliminated." 69 The
court specifically determined that "categorically denying all foreigners
constitutes irrational discrimination, exceeds social norms, and amounts
to an illegal act.' 70 Although Yunohana enjoys a right to practice a profession, and may eject patrons who are causing trouble in individual
cases, a categorical ban was too broad to be considered rational.7 As in
64.
See Arudou, 1150 HANREI TAIMUZU at 191; Webster, Arudou v. Earth Cure, supra
note 60, at 302.
65.
Arudou, 1150 HANREI TAIMUZU at 187-88; Webster, Arudou v. Earth Cure, supra
note 60, at 300.

66.
The claims against the municipal government were dismissed. The court held that
Article 2(d) of CERD, which calls for "legislation as required by circumstance" imposes
merely a "political obligation," and not a "legal obligation," on municipal bodies. See Arudou,
1150 HANREI TAIMUZU at 194; Webster, Arudou v. Earth Cure, supra note 60, at 319.
67.

KENP6, art. 14, para. I ("All of the people are equal under the law and there shall be

no discrimination in political, economic or social relations because of race, creed, sex, social
status or family origin.").
68.
Article 26 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR)
states,
All persons are equal before the law and are entitled without any discrimination to
the equal protection of the law. In this respect, the law shall prohibit any discrimination and guarantee to all persons equal and effective protection against

discrimination on any ground such as race, colour,sex, language, religion, political
or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status.
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 26, Dec. 19, 1966, S. EXEC. Doc. E,
95-2 (1978), 999 U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter ICCPR] (emphasis added).
69.
Arudou, 1150 HANREI TAIMUZU at 193-94; Webster, Arudou v. Earth Cure, supra
note 60, at 317-18.
70.
Arudou, 1150 HANREI TALMUZU at 194; Webster, Arudou v. Earth Cure, supra note
60, at 318.
71.
Arudou, 1150 HANREI TAIMUZU at 194; Webster, Arudou v. Earth Cure, supra note
60, at 318.
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Bortz, the court ordered compensation based on the mental anguish that
the plaintiffs had suffered.72
As to the second claim, against the municipal government, the court
held that there was no "clear and uniform obligation" to pass an antidiscrimination law.73 Article 2(1) of CERD provides that "[e]ach State
Party shall prohibit and bring to an end, by all appropriate means, including legislation as required by circumstance, racial discrimination by
any person, group or organization. 74 The court construed this language
to impose a "political obligation," not a "legal obligation," on Otaru.75
Since Otaru hosted several meetings, distributed fliers, and repeatedly
requested Yunohana to end their policy, the court determined that it had
fulfilled this obligation. 6
7

3. Murthy v. Nikken Jahan

Srirama Chandra Bemri Murthy, a citizen of India, had spent many
years in Japan, first with his diplomat father from 1990 to 1993. 78 He
returned in late 1997, with a scholarship from the Japanese Ministry of
Education, to study at Keio University. He remained in Japan, working at
a software company. In 2001, he sought housing for himself and his
pregnant wife. After being rejected from various real estate agencies, he
decided to call instead.
He explained his situation in Japanese to a real estate agent at Nikken Jfihan in the following way.79 He first explained that he was an
Indian citizen looking for a place to live. The real estate agent then asked
him what the color of his skin was. Murthy hesitated, whereupon the
agent repeated her question. "The color of my skin?," Murthy clarified.
72.
Arudou, 1150 HANREi TAIMUZU at 195; Webster, Arudou v. Earth Cure, supra note
60, at 321.
73.
Arudou, 1150 HANREI TAIMUZU at 195; Webster, Arudou v. Earth Cure, supra note
60, at 320.
CERD, supra note 37, art. 2.
74.
Arudou, 1150 HANREi TAIMuZU at 195; Webster, Arudou v. Earth Cure, supra note
75.
60, at 320.
Arudou, 1150 HANREI TAIMuZU at 195; Webster, Arudou v. Earth Cure, supra note
76.
60, at 320.
Murthy v. Nikken JMhan, Wa No. 2332, at 2 (Saitama D. Ct., Jan. 14, 2003). This
77.
case received a small amount of media attention in both the Japanese and Indian press. See,
e.g., Tony Laszlo, Opinion: Wanted, Color-Blind Realtors, JAPAN TIMES ONLINE, Aug. 8,
2003, http://www.japantimes.co.jp/shukan-st/english-news/opinion/2003/op2OO3808/op20
30808text.htm (providing more background); Nation at a Glance: Japan Damages for
Skin Colour Query, TELEGRAPH-CALCUTTA, Jan. 16, 2003, available at http://
(providing details of the
www.telegraphindia.com1030116/asp/nation/story-1578380.asp
parties' names and backgrounds). Nikken Jihan is an affiliate of the U.S. real estate giant,
Century 21. See Nikken Corporation, http://www.refo2l .jp/com/ (last visited Sept. 24, 2008).
78.
Murthy, Wa No. 2332, at 2.
Id.
79.

Fall 2008]

Reconstituting JapaneseLaw

"Is it a normal color?" the agent replied. Murthy again paused for clarification, "What does normal color of skin mean?" The agent further
elaborated, "The color of Japanese skin "' 80
Murthy immediately hung up the phone. He wrote a letter to the real
estate agency protesting the incident and demanding a written apology.
He also wrote to the governor of Saitama Prefecture, asking the Prefecture to opine on the matter.8 The real estate agency first sent an apology,
bearing the signatures of both a company representative and the offending agent. Murthy was unconvinced by their sincerity. Next, the agent
sent an apology that she had written herself. The representative and the
agent finally agreed to meet with Murthy face-to-face, and even to provide financial compensation. Murthy remained dissatisfied by these
offers."2
The Prefecture, even before the incident, had distributed to real estate agencies a pamphlet entitled "Manual on Leasing Real Estate for
Landlords and Foreigners." 3 After receiving Murthy's letter, the Prefecture instructed real estate companies to train their agents on the basic
human rights of foreigners 4 Unimpressed by these various responses,
Murthy filed a two-track lawsuit, a la Arudou, against the Prefecture, as
well as against the real estate company and the agent.85
The Saitama District Court found that the agent's racially insensitive
questions constituted a "serious illegal act that injured the Plaintiff's
human dignity," rendering the agent liable under Article 709 of the Civil
Code. 86 The court further held that the real estate agency was liable to
Murthy under Article 715 of the Civil Code, which provides for respondeat superior liability.8 7 That article provides that an employer shall be
liable for an employee's illegal conduct if carried out in the normal
course of business. 88 The court held that "it was clear that the plaintiff
suffered emotional distress as a result of the illegal acts"8 9 and ordered
the agency to pay Murthy 400,000 yen in damages and 100,000 yen in
attorney's fees. 90
As in the Arudou decision, however, the court was more lenient with
the Prefecture. In addition to distributing the manual, the Prefecture had
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.

Id. at 6.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

85.

Id. at 7.
Id.; see also MINP6, art. 709.

86.
87.

Id.; see also MINP6, art. 715.

88.

MINP6,

89.
90.

Murthy, Wa No. 2332, at 7.
Id.

art. 715.
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also informed real estate agents about the Murthy case, and demanded
that the agents act with honest respect for basic human rights. The plaintiff claimed that the Prefecture should have taken a stronger stance
before the incident happened-in essence, warning real estate agencies
that such conduct was not allowed. The court, however, did not find the
Prefecture's "failure to exercise its authority extremely unreasonable." 9'
Thus, it did not find that the Prefecture's omission was illegal.
92
4. Plaintiffv. Tokyo Bar

The fourth lawsuit involves another Asian plaintiff, a naturalized
Japanese citizen of Chinese descent.93 The plaintiff first visited a bar in
Tokyo's Toshima Ward in February 2003, but was ejected after approximately one hour.94 According to two of the defendants-a male employee
and a female employee-the man's loud bragging about his mafiarelated activities offended various patrons ("I do it all. Guns, cocaine,
smuggling-I do it all."). 9' Their manager, after hearing about the incident, advised the male employee to deny the Chinese plaintiff entrance
in the future.
After the incident, the plaintiff sought advice from a lawyer. The
lawyer, no doubt aware of the difficulty of proving racial discrimination,
counseled him to return to the bar and record his conversations with the
staff.96 The plaintiff revisited the bar at the end of May 2003, with a recording device placed inside his bag.97 This time, the male employee
simply refused to allow him in the bar. The following exchange between
the plaintiff (P) and the male employee (D) clearly evinces discrimination:
D: Yes. I'm sorry but I have to ask, are you a foreigner?
P: Well, I was born in China.
D: Well, Chinese aren't allowed at our bar.
P: Why aren't they allowed?
D: For the time being, they aren't allowed in.
91.

Id. at8.

92.
Wa No. 14386 (Tokyo D. Ct., Sept. 16, 2004).
93.
Id. This case did not attract nearly as much media attention as those discussed
above. I found only a passing reference in a Japan Times article about the Arudou case, and a
short description of the case on appeal in the Japanese-language Mainichi Shimbun. But, it

does appear in the LEX/DB Internet Database. Like all Japanese publication services (print or
online), LEX/DB does not publish the names of the parties, choosing letters or numbers to
signify plaintiff and defendant.
94.
Id. at 2.

95.
96.
97.

Id. at 3.
Id. at 4.
Id.
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P: No, but I'm really going to pay.
D: No, no, even if you pay.
P: Foreigners aren't allowed?
D: Yes.
P: Well, I was born in China, but now I'm a naturalized Japanese.
D: Even so.
P: Even so, I'm not allowed?
D: Yes.
P: Well this bar...
D: Sir, haven't you been to our bar once or twice before?
P: No, I haven't.
D: I see. Well, in any event, we don't allow foreigners.98
This evidence convinced the Tokyo District Court that the plaintiff
had experienced racial discrimination: "After entering the bar, Plaintiff
was ejected in front of other customers for no reason other than being
Chinese or Chinese-born. Later, he was refused entrance for the same
reason. These incidents were very humiliating, and caused emotional
distress."99 Although the defendants objected that the first incident was
motivated by the plaintiff's own unruly behavior,' ° the court noted that,
during the second incident, the employee's statement suggested that the
bar had a "basic policy" (kihontekina h6shin) of refusing foreigners;''
this lent credibility to the plaintiff's testimony that the first incident was
also racially motivated.
The court did not address whether the defendants' conduct specifically violated the provisions of law that the plaintiff had cited, such as
Article 14(1) of the Japanese Constitution;' 2 Article 26 of the ICCPR;'0 3
and Articles 2(1)(d), 5(f), and 5 of CERD' " The court did, however, note
98.
99.

Id. at 6.
Id. at 5.

100.
Id.
101.
Id.
102.
KENP5, art. 14, para. 1.
103.
ICCPR, supra note 68, art. 26.
104.
CERD, supra note 37, art. 2(l)(d) ("Each State Party shall prohibit ...racial discrimination by any persons."); id. art. 5 (illustrating rights that all persons shall enjoy without
discrimination); id. art 5(f) ("The right of access to any place or service intended for use by
the general public ...").
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that refusing the plaintiff based on his nationality amounted to "discriminatory treatment not based on a legitimate reason, which should be
illegal."'0 5 It then ordered both the male employee and the manager to
pay 550,000 yen in damages, and the female employee to pay 450,000
yen (she was not present for the May refusal). The court did not grant the
full two million yen in damages that the plaintiff had initially sought because the bar "did not provide an indispensable service necessary to
Plaintiff's everyday existence."' 6
On appeal, the Tokyo High Court acknowledged the illegality of the
defendants' conduct, but reduced the damages award to 300,000 yen.'07
This verdict was upheld by the Japanese Supreme Court in August
2005.'8
5. McGowan v. Narita'09
The McGowan decision represents a brief aberration in the unfolding
of racial discrimination jurisprudence of Japan; McGowan had to appeal
the trial court decision against him in order to vindicate his encounter
with racism. Its divergence from the above trends makes it an extremely
important case to consider, both for its jurisprudential value, such as it is,
and as a warning to future plaintiffs.
Steve McGowan, an African-American designer, had lived in Japan
for nearly a decade. He came to Japan with the U.S. Army Special
Forces in 1995, married a Japanese woman, and settled outside of
Osaka."0 In September 2004, he stood outside of an eyeglass store, admiring some frames with a South African friend. "They have even better
ones inside," McGowan offered, as he had once visited the store."'
Narita Takashi, the director of the store, stepped out of the store. According to McGowan's testimony, Narita unleashed a string of invective:
"Get out of here. I hate black people. Don't touch the door. Don't touch
the window. You're bothering me. Impossible! ' " 2 Narita also waved the
105.
106.

Wa No. 14386 (Tokyo D. Ct., Sept. 16, 2004).
Id.

107.
See Gaikokujin nyaten kyohi no sonbai sosh: misegawa no haiso kakuteiSaikasaikettei [Compensationclaim against store that refused entrance to foreigner: Supreme
Court affirms decision that store loses], MAINICHI SHIMBUN CHIIKI BAN, Aug. 4, 2005 (on
file with author).

108.
109.

Id.
McGowan v. Narita, Wa No. 11926 (Osaka D. Ct., Jan. 30, 2006).

110.

McGowan, Wa No. 11926, at 5; see also Webster, McGowan v. Narita, supra note

27, at 354. As with the Bortz and Arudou cases, this Essay will cite to the English-language
translation of the McGowan opinion in addition to the original.
Ill.
McGowan, Wa No. 11926, at 2; Webster, McGowan v. Narita, supra note 27, at
346.
112.

McGowan, Wa No. 11926, at 7; Webster, McGowan v. Narita, supra note 27, at 355.
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backs of both hands, "as if driving away an animal." '3 McGowan was
stunned.
More surprising than the incident itself was the Osaka District
Court's decision, handed down in January 2006. Due to "insufficient
evidence," the court dismissed McGowan's claims; McGowan could not
prove that he heard the above invective. The court dwelled on the fact
that McGowan could not be sure whether he heard Narita claim that he
hated "black people" (kokujin), or "foreigners" (gaikokujin).ll1 This is a
bizarre distinction for the court to draw, as either statement would register racism in this context: a Japanese man yelling at an AfricanAmerican man that he hates foreigners/blacks.
More troubling still, when McGowan and his wife returned to the
store to discuss the incident, Narita told them that he had "bad memories" of black people based on his prior experiences."' Thus, Narita
became "excited" when he saw McGowan."6 Nevertheless, the court held
that McGowan was, in effect, not good enough at Japanese to ascertain
the meaning of Narita's utterances.1
Fortunately for McGowan, and the reputation of the Japanese judiciary, this decision was overturned on appeal. In an unpublished opinion
rendered in October 2006, the Osaka High Court awarded McGowan
350,000 yen in compensation,"' a fraction of what Arudou and Bortz had
received. Like the district court, the appellate court did not find that Narita
had committed an act of racial discrimination. '9 However, the appellate
court did find that Narita's acts exceeded "social norms," which suffices to
attach liability under Japanese tort law.'20
To be sure, this reversal went a long way to restore the good name
of the Japanese judiciary. However, it also points to a fundamental
problem in racial discrimination lawsuits: the evidentiary burden. Since
plaintiffs in Japanese civil suits face a very high burden of proof, at
least by common law standards,' 2 ' they are frequently at a disadvantage
in racial discrimination lawsuits. When a Japanese defendant claims that
7

113.
McGowan, Wa No. 11926, at 2; Webster, McGowan v. Narita, supra note 27, at 346.
114.
McGowan, Wa No. 11926, at 8; Webster, McGowan v. Narita, supra note 27, at 351.
115.
McGowan, Wa No. 11926, at 9; Webster, McGowan v. Narita,supra note 27, at 350.
116.
McGowan, Wa No. 11926, at 9; Webster, McGowan v. Narita, supra note 27, at 350.
117.
McGowan, Wa No. 11926, at 16; Webster, McGowan v. Narita,supra note 27, at 358.
118.
The appellate decision is not available. Consequently, I have reiied on newspaper
reports to determine the holding. See, e.g., Johnston, supra note 27.
119.
Id.
120.
Eric Johnston, Reporter Eric Johnston on McGowan Victorious Appeal, Oct. 19,
2006, http://www.debito.org/?p=52 (reporting the High Court's finding that Narita exceeded
social norms).
121.
Professor Kevin Clermont has likened the Japanese burden of proof to the exacting
"beyond a reasonable doubt" standard of common law. See Kevin Clermont, Standards of
Proofin Japan and the United States, 37 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 263,264 (2004).
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a foreign plaintiff misunderstood a defendant's statements, he can often
neutralize the testimony offered by the plaintiff.
Indeed, this is precisely the strategy deployed by the defendant in the
McGowan case. By assailing McGowan's linguistic abilities, Narita undermined the credibility of the testimony brought forth against him. He
was then able to persuade the court of first instance that his actions were
not racially motivated. Although reversed on appeal, the McGowan decision points to the need for a better method to handle racial
discrimination lawsuits.
B. Antithesis: PermissibleDiscrimination
The previous decisions evince a strong stance by the Japanese judiciary against blatant racism. In each case, the racist conduct was overt: a
verbal exchange during which the plaintiff's race was referenced explicitly, a sign or policy posted on the wall. But what about less visible
forms of racial discrimination? This Section considers plaintiffs who
have been excluded from private clubs, barred from cultural activities,
and denied financial services without access to the private rules that exclude them. Japanese courts have been far less likely to find
discriminatory acts "illegal" in these realms. Just as the United States
has devised "rational basis" scrutiny to adjudicate certain acts of discrimination, so too have the Japanese courts. If a defendant can articulate
"reasonable grounds" for his act of discrimination, a court is likely to
find in his favor.'22 Three kinds of cases suffice to show where Japanese
courts draw the line between acceptable and unacceptable discrimination.
1. Swinging Both Ways: The Golf Club Cases
In the United States, the "freedom of expressive association" permits
private bodies to discriminate based on factors such as race, gender, and
sexual orientation. ' The Japanese Constitution, which enshrines many
of the freedoms safeguarded by its U.S. counterpart, likewise permits
private associations to discriminate based on race.' 24When applied, this
122.
See infra notes 168-184 and accompanying text.
123.
Public accommodations laws in the United States have diminished the number and
type of places that may discriminatorily exclude members of a disfavored group. Yet, the First

Amendment still guarantees the right to choose one's associates. Thus, courts must decide
whether the group engages in some form of expression in order to determine whether it has
the right to exclude such persons. See generally Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640

(2000) (concluding that it is permissible for the Boy Scouts to prevent an openly gay man
from serving as a group leader).
124.

Compare U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, and Boy Scouts of Am., 530 U.S. at 640, with
art. 14, and Plaintiff v. Hachi6ji Country Club, 1043 HANREI JIHO 74 (Tokyo D. Ct.,
Sept. 9, 1981).
KENPO,
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principle has allowed Japanese golf clubs to turn down applicants due to
their racial or ethnic background. Resident Koreans, in particular, have
been rejected numerous times for precisely that reason.' 21 When these
racist restrictions are challenged in courts of law, however, the results
have varied. In the three opinions that I have been able to locate, 2 6 discrimination based on freedom of association was permitted in two
instances, but held illegal in a third. This in itself points to the need for
guidance.
a. Plaintiffv. Hachiji Country Club'

The first case concerning golf club membership, decided in 1981,
involved a naturalized Japanese citizen of Korean descent. 28 He had
grown up in Japan, spoke Japanese, and was well acculturated into Japanese society.' 29 He wanted to join a country club in Tokyo, but was
refused because of his ethnic background.' 3
The club had a regulation restricting the membership of foreigners
and recently naturalized Japanese citizens. According to the court, the
decision of whether to admit "foreigners, or those who had naturalized
but only been citizens for a certain number of years," was properly left to
the "autonomous discretion" of the membership committee."' This policy was based on the presumption that "foreigners are generally different
from the Japanese in lifestyle, behavior, customs, ways of thinking, emotions, and other spiritual activities. Moreover, since it is difficult to
overcome the language barrier, there are many situations where it may
be difficult' 32to form relationships of mutual trust between foreigners and
Japanese."'

The plaintiff indicated that, as a lifelong resident of Japan and recently naturalized Japanese citizen, the above policy concerns were
inapposite. The court agreed, noting that "the mechanical application of
the regulation may be prejudicial to this plaintiff.' 2' 23 Nevertheless, both
of his legal claims were dismissed.
125.
See Akira Masaoka, Kanasai Kogin Hurt Community, DAILY YOMIURI, Jan. 26,
2002, at 2 ("[M]any other golf courses refuse membership to ethnic Koreans.").
126.
I found mention, but no judicial opinion, for a fourth lawsuit. See Japan-Born Korean to Sue Golf Course for Discrimination; Saitozaki Country Club, KYoDO NEWS SERV.,
July 1, 1989 (describing a lawsuit brought by resident Korean Kim Sang Gil against the Saitozaki Country Club for refusing his membership without specifying a reason).
127.
Hachi6ji Country Club, 1043 HANREI JIH6 at 74.

128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.

See id. at 75.
See id.
See id.
Id. at 75-76.
Id. at77.
Id.
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First, based on Article 14(1) of the Constitution, '34 the plaintiff argued that the policy violated the right to equality that all Japanese
citizens enjoy. As we have seen, however, this constitutional provision
only applies to government bodies. Private entities such as golf courses
are presumably135 immune.
Second, the plaintiff claimed that the regulation violated public order
36
and good morals, in violation of Article 90 of the Japanese Civil Code.
However, the court held that since the country club did not make its
regulations public, it could not violate the public order. Moreover, as a
private entity, the country club had the autonomy to decide how to implement its policies. If the plaintiff's five and one-half years as a
naturalized Japanese citizen did not satisfy the "certain number of years"
requirement
of the regulation, that too would "not violate the public or37
der."'
The court denied the plaintiff recovery, indirectly approving the
club's discriminatory membership policies. It is important to note the
court's deference to the club's regulations. The court did not pry into
whether the five-year limit was rational, instead giving considerable discretion to the club's creation and implementation of membership
policies.
b. Yi TOk-ung v. S. T. T. Development Corp.3 '
In the mid-1990s, even before Japan had ratified CERD, the Tokyo
District Court heard a similar case regarding discrimination by a golf
club. In this case, the plaintiff, Yi T6k-ung, was a resident Korean born
and raised in Japan, but who had not taken Japanese citizenship.
Yi was the president of a paint manufacturing company. In 1988, his
company took out a corporate membership in the Pete-Dye Golf Course,
registered under the name of a Japanese employee. ' 9 In 1991, Yi wanted
to transfer the membership to himself in his individual capacity.' 4 The
golf course refused because, unlike the employee, Yi was not a citizen of
Japan. Yi claimed emotional damages and sought compensation. 4 '
134.
135.

See supra note 102.
But see Yt T6k-ung v. S.T.T. Dev. Corp., 874 HANREI TAIMuzU 298 (Tokyo D. Ct.,

Mar. 23, 1995) (ruling that a golf course is a quasi-public entity for the purposes of constitutional analysis).
136.

MINP6,

art. 90 ("Any legal act that aims to violate the public order or good morals

is void.").
137.
Hachi6ji Country Club, 1043 HANREI JIHO at 75.
138.
11T6k-ung, 874 HANREI TAIMUZU at 298.
139.
See Court Disallows Golf Club Membership Nationality Rule, KYoDO
Mar. 23, 1995.
140.
Id.
141.
)1 TOk-ung, 874 HANREI TAIMUZU at 298.
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Like the plaintiff in Hachi6ji Country Club, Yi formulated his legal
challenge on both Article 14(1) of the Constitution and Article 90 of the
Civil Code. 4 2 In this case, however, the Tokyo District Court came to the
opposite conclusion. Initially, the court reasoned, golf clubs were exclusive domains dedicated to leisure and relationship-building among their
members; it was therefore permissible to exhibit a degree of arbitrariness
in their membership policies. 43 Since that time, however, golf had grown
more popular among the people of Japan.'" Membership rights circulated in the marketplace; campaigns to recruit new members also entered
the public realm. Thus, the court determined that
[i]t cannot be denied that golf clubs are organizations with a certain social nature. Thus golf clubs, while enjoying wide latitude
in their own management, cannot enjoy completely autonomous
discretion; there should be some limits. It is unavoidable that, in
exercising
their discretion, certain deviations will be held to be
4
illegal. 5
The court further held that, under contemporary social norms, it was difficult to discern a "rational ground" (g6riteki riya) for excluding a
resident Korean, especially given this46 particular plaintiff's background
and familiarity with Japanese culture.
The court ordered S.T.T. Development to pay Yi 3 million yen in
compensation for emotional damages. It also required the golf club to
permit the transfer of the corporate membership to Yi in his individual
capacity. '4 He would henceforth be a "playing member" (pureiingu
membaa) in the jargon of Japanese golf.
c. Hyon Yong Ok v. Chiba Country Club
The Tokyo District Court heard a third golf club case in 2001, five
years after Japan ratified CERD. 141This ratification may have led some to
anticipate a holding more deferential to foreign plaintiffs. This expectation
would have been buttressed by the fact that the same district court had
found similar behavior illegal and compensable in the Yi T6k-ung decision of 1995. But, once again, the Tokyo District 49Court reversed course
and found in favor of the discriminating golf club.
"

142.
KENP6, art. 14, para. 1; MINP6, art. 90.
143.
Y T6k-ung, 874 HANREI TAIMUZU at 301.
144.
Id.
145.
Id.
146.
Id. at 302.
147.
Id.
148.
Hyon v. Chiba Country Club (Hyon 1), 1773 HANREI JIH6 36 (Tokyo D. Ct., May
31, 2001), aff'd, 1773 HANREI JiH6 34 (Tokyo H. Ct., Jan. 31, 2002).
149.
Id. at 44.
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Hyon purchased a golf membership from a Japanese friend in
1995, 50 fully aware that the golf club had restricted the number of foreign members that it would accept. 5 ' The golf club rationalized its
regulation on the theories that foreign members (1) placed large bets on
their golf games; (2) argued while on the green and generally behaved
badly; and (3) played only with other foreigners, and avoided playing
with the Japanese.' To minimize such nuisances, the club's
53 executive
council had passed a resolution to limit foreign membership.1
In the court of first instance, Hyon challenged this resolution as a
violation of Article 14(1) of the Constitution and Articles 90 and 709 of
the Civil Code.' 54 More than in the previous pair of golf club decisions,
the Tokyo District Court analyzed the constitutional claim. As a preliminary matter, the court noted that constitutional protections did, except in
special circumstances, extend to foreigners.'5 5 Next, the court noted the
possible contradictions between provisions of the Constitution, which
guaranteed the right to equality on the one hand, and the freedom of association and right to economic activity (property, occupation) on the
other.'56 The court went on to explain that the government could intervene in interpersonal relations only in the exceptionally rare situation in
which the infringement of a person's rights exceeded social norms in
light of a particular constitutional provision.' 7
In sum, the golf club's constitutionally guaranteed freedom of association trumped Hyon's right to equality. Likewise, the resolution did not
violate the public order, which would have made it voidable under Article 90 of the Civil Code;' 8 nor was it an illegal act under Article 709 of
the same. 5 9
Although bound by neither of the previous Tokyo District Court's
decisions, the Hyon I court referenced both cases, and attempted to distinguish the Y Tbk-ung decision. Specifically, it acknowledged that the
golf club's restriction on foreign members "did, taken as a whole, have

See Discrimination Suit Against Golf Club Fails: Judge Tells Ethnic Korean that
150.
Restricting Foreigners is Organization's Right, JAPAN TIMES ONLINE, June 1, 2001,
http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/nn20010601 a8.html.
151.
Hyon 1,1773 HANREI JIH6 at41.
152.
Id.
153.
Id.
KENP6, art. 14, para. 1;MINP6, art. 709 ("A person who violates intentionally or
154.
negligently the right of another is bound to make compensation for damage arising therefrom."); see also supra note 67.
155.
Hyon 1, 1773 HANREIJIH6 at 42.
156.
Id.
157.
Id.
See supra note 136.
158.
Hyon 1,1773 HANREI JIH6 at 44.
159.

Fall 2008]

Reconstituting JapaneseLaw

an impact on society." '6° Nonetheless, because the golf club enjoyed private autonomy, and the freedom of association, its exclusionary policy
could not violate social norms. And, because there was no violation of
social norms, the court explicitly refused to consider whether the regulation of foreign members was rational, or
what reasons the club had for
16
'
resolution.
nationality-based
its
adopting
On appeal to the Tokyo High Court, Hyon added a claim based on
i
CERD. 62
The appellate court provided two reasons for dismissing this
additional claim. First, the court noted that CERD only applies to governmental bodies, and so could not regulate relations between private
actors. 163 Second, the court recalled that Japan had included a reservation
to its ratification of CERD that had preserved the "freedom of assembly,
6,
association, and expression" enjoyed by Japanese " "
In the rarefied air of golf clubs, there is some doubt as to the legality
of race- or nationality-based discrimination. One court found this kind of
discrimination rational,' 65 a second court found it irrational,'6 and a third
refused to inquire as to the rationality of such a policy. 67 The legal status
of racially exclusive membership policies is thus an area of uncertainty
in Japanese law.
6
2. Financial Services: Herman v. Asahi Bank 1

As noted above, the foreign media has played an important role in
the prosecution of racial discrimination cases in Japan.169 In Herman v.
Asahi Bank, the plaintiff, Steve Herman, was serving as chairman of the

160.
Id.
161.
Id.
162.
Hyon v. Chiba Country Club (Hyon I1), 1773
Jan. 31, 2002).
163.
Id.
164.
The Tokyo High Court stated,

HANREI JIH6

34, 36 (Tokyo H. Ct.,

In applying the provisions of paragraphs (a) and (b) of article 4 [of CERD] Japan
fulfills the obligations under those provisions to the extent that fulfillment of the
obligations is compatible with the guarantee of the rights to freedom of assembly,
association and expression and other rights under the Constitution of Japan, noting
the phrase "with due regard to the principles embodied in the Universal Declaration
of Human Rights and the rights expressly set forth in article 5 of this Convention"
referred to in article 4.
Id.
165.
Plaintiff v. Hachi6ji Country Club, 1043 HANREI JH6 74, 75 (Tokyo D. Ct., Sept. 9,
1981).
166.
Yi T6k-ung v. S.T.T. Dev. Corp., 874 HANREI TAIMuZU, 298, 302 (Tokyo D. Ct.,
Mar. 23, 1995).
167.
Hyon 1, 1773 HANREI JIH6 34, 44 (Tokyo H. Ct., Jan. 31, 2002).
168.
Herman v. Asahi Bank, 1789 HANREI JIH6 96, 97 (Tokyo D. Ct., Nov. 12, 2001).
169.
See supra note 55 and accompanying text.
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Foreign Press in Japan.'7 ° Although he had lived in Japan for ten years,
Herman had still not become a permanent resident. 7 2 The case arose
when a bank rejected his mortgage application, in response to which he
filed a racial discrimination lawsuit.
The forty-one-year-old U.S. citizen claimed that the Asahi Bank had
"a secret manual that forbids them from accepting an application from
anyone who is not a citizen or resident of Japan."'' 3 This discrimination,
the ICCPR,
Herman alleged, amounted to a violation of the Constitution,
7
1
and CERD. 74 He sought eleven million yen in damages.'
In its defense, the bank argued that its policy of refusing loans to
non-permanent residents had a non-discriminatory purpose. Because
such people are not certain to stay in Japan, temporary residents posed a
special risk to potential creditors by, for example, leaving Japan before
of outstanding
repaying outstanding debts. To minimize the number
76
loans, the bank rebutted, such a policy was rational.
The Tokyo District Court did not scrutinize the policy's rationality
with the same tenacity it had in, for example, the Hyon I case.'77 The
court entertained the possibility that, if a non-permanent resident's visa
were not renewed, he could be forcibly deported in accordance with immigration law.' Were that to happen, "even if [his property] were
secured by person or thing in Japan, the expense, time and effort needed
to manage and collect the debt would invariably be greater than if the
debtor had remained in Japan.' ' 79 This passed the court's "rational basis"
test. Although the bank's concern about a mortgagor's fleeing would not
apply to everyone, and certainly not to Herman, the court accepted it
with significant deference. A party's justification for discrimination need
not be airtight, it would seem. But neither can it be empty.
The court also dismissed Herman's CERD claim. First, it found that
the language of CERD did not apply to the facts of his case." 0 Article
1(2) specifically states that CERD "shall not apply to distinctions, exclusions, restrictions or preferences ... between citizens and non170.
See Yumiko Miyai, Credit Not Given Where Credit Is Due, DAILY YOMIURI, Mar.
15, 2002, at 7.
See Hadfield, supra note 55.
171.
Herman, 1789 HANREI JIH6 at 97.
172.
173.
Id. at 100.
174.
Id. at 98-99; see KENP6, art. 14, para. 1; ICCPR, supra note 68, art. 26; CERD,
supra note 37, art. 1(1).
175.
Herman, 1789 HANREI JIH6 at 97.
Id. at 99.
176.
Id. at 101-02.
177.
Id. at 101.
178.
179.
Id.
180.
Herman, 1789 HANREI Jn-6 at 102.
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citizens.' ' 'Since the bank was, at least implicitly, distinguishing citizens
from non-citizens (or non-permanent
residents), the court determined
82
that there had been no violation.'
Second, the court found that the act of discriminating against a nonpermanent resident did not run afoul of the proscribed classifications
listed in CERD: race, color, descent, or national or ethnic origin. 3 Since
the bank's policy did not implicate any of these prohibited bases, it could
not have violated the express provisions of CERD. Of course, in practice, the vast majority of non-permanent residents in Japan-like
Herman-could very well be of a different race. However, because the
policy did not single out a proscribed classification, de facto discrimination would not be illegal.' "
3. Cultural Activities: Shukert v. Miyagi Prefecture'85
Finally, the Japanese Supreme Court has allowed amateur sports
leagues to exclude foreigners from participating in national tournaments.
In Shukert v. Miyagi Prefecture, a U.S. citizen wanted to play in Japan's
national amateur hockey tournament but was barred because of his nationality.'86 The plaintiff, Douglas Shukert, filed a claim based on Article
14 of the Constitution and on CERD, 87 which he pursued all the way to
the Supreme Court.
The Supreme Court affirmed what both lower courts had found: that
the national tournament was designed to train Japanese athletes for international competitions.' Thus, Article 14 of the Constitution "did not
provide absolute equality; some discriminatory treatment can be recognized as rational depending on the nature of the matter."' 89 The court did
181.
182.
183.

CERD, supra note 37, art. 1(2).
Herman, 1789 HANREI JIH6 at 102.
Id. Article 1(1) states that "racial discrimination" shall mean any

distinction, exclusion, restriction or preference based on race, color, descent, or national or ethnic origin which has the purpose or effect of nullifying or impairing the
recognition, enjoyment or exercise, on an equal footing, of human rights and fundamental freedoms in the political, economic, social, cultural or any other field of
public life.
CERD,supra note 37, art. 1(1).
184.
Herman, 1789 HANREI JIH6 at 102.
185.
Shukert v. Miyagi Prefecture, Wa No. 1131 (Sendal D. Ct., Nov. 25, 2002) (on file
with author), aff'd, Wa No. 2 (Sendai H. Ct., July 25, 2003) (on file with author), aff'd, Wa
No. 1741 (S. Ct., June 11, 2004) (on file with author).
186.
See Hall, supra note 36.
187.
KENP6, art. 14, para. 1;CERD, supra note 37, arts. 1,14.
188.
Shukert, Wa No. 1741, at 1.
189.
Id.; Gaikokujin seigen wa goken, kokutai no sankashikaku meguri saikosai [Restrictingforeignersfrom playing in the national tournamentdoes not violate the Constitution],
ASAHI SHIMBUN, June 12, 2004 (on file with author).
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not specify what "matters" or forms of discriminatory treatment would
qualify as rational.
C. Synthesis
The above case law reveals a split between permissible and impermissible discrimination. Generally, if the discriminating entity can
articulate a reasonable basis for the discriminatory policy, a court will
uphold the exclusion as legal.' 9° Courts show varying degrees of scrutiny
in their reasonableness analyses, in some cases glossing over it, 9' and in
'
others tenaciously prodding the proffered justification, as in Hyon 11. 92
As a rule, a court must adduce some social benefit to permit the exclusion. Pure fear of the foreign will not pass muster.
In Herman and Shukert, the defendant stated a good-faith reason for
excluding foreigners.' 93 In Herman, the bank cited the problem of additional collection costs from fleeing foreign creditors. 94 On closer
inspection, however, this is not a particularly robust justification. Japanese citizens could also quit the country, leaving their mortgaged
property for the bank to initiate foreclosure. However, there is a rational
link between the discrimination and the purported-though unprovensocial benefit. Banks should be able to minimize the potentially higher
costs associated with collecting debts.
Likewise, in Shukert, the development of amateur athletes provided a
rationalbasis for excluding foreigners from playing in a national tournament.9 Again, this justification is not airtight, but rather a more or
less defensible explanation of the sports league's conduct.
By contrast, those accused of discrimination in the cases discussed
in Part II.A lacked a good faith basis for their exclusion. The categorical
rejection of foreigners from a bar, bathhouse, or jewelry store benefits no
one. True, such policies may minimize awkward interchanges between
Japanese and foreigners, making for a smoother social environment. But
social ease, as seen in the Arudou decision, 96 does not promote a sufficient societal interest to permit discrimination.
Between these poles lie the problematic golf club lawsuits. Japan
recognizes the freedom of association, and with it a private organizaSee, e.g., Herman v. Asahi Bank, 1789 HANREI JIH6 96, 102 (Tokyo D. Ct., Nov.
190.
12, 2001); supra notes 168-182 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., Plaintiff v. Hachi6ji Country Club, 1043 HANREI JIH6 74 (Tokyo D. Ct.,
191.

Sept. 9, 1981); supra notes 127-137 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., Hyon v. Chiba Country Club (Hyon II), 1773 HANREI
192.
H. Ct., Jan. 31, 2002); supra notes 159-163 and accompanying text.
See supra Parts II.B.2, I.B.3.
193.
See supra Part II.B.2.
194.
See supra Part II.B.3.
195.
196.
See supra Part II.A.2.
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tion's right to discriminate in selecting its members. In some ways, it is
difficult to draw a principled division between a private club, which may
discriminate in selecting its membership, and a bathhouse, which may
not impose the same standards in choosing its clientele. Is a private
club's freedom of association so important that the State will not interfere, but rather, in effect, sanction a discriminatory policy? Why is
apprehension about mingling with foreigners valid when it comes to accepting them as members, but invalid when it comes to permitting them
as patrons? And why are unproven allegations about cost collection defensible, but social anxieties bred of an inability to communicate with
non-Japanese speakers so readily dismissed? These questions indicate
some of the legal lacunae that Japanese legislators may want to consider.
In the meantime, one could argue that the attention generated by
these lawsuits has had a didactic effect in Japan. But a stronger response,
such as a law banning racial discrimination, would bring Japan more in
line with the international community. Rather than rely on the legalistic
legerdemain of judges who indirectly apply international law, Japan
should take a stronger stance against racism. The point is not that Japan
is a particularly racist country; every society is racist to some degree.
Rather, with an incomplete commitment to racial diversity, Japan does
not live up to the role on the world stage that it believes it rightfully
holds.
III. THE GOVERNMENT OF JAPAN AND
U.N. HUMAN RIGHTS REGIME

THE

While private citizens have challenged racially discriminatory conduct in Japanese courts, a related debate has been unfolding between the
Japanese government and various U.N. bodies. Through presentations
and reports, these interactions highlight the various socio-legal problems
surrounding racial discrimination in Japan. The strophe of international
pressure for anti-discrimination laws is repeatedly rebuffed by the Japanese antistrophe that denies the necessity of such legislation. This
section highlights relevant findings from three U.N. bodies: the Human
Rights Committee, which monitors ICCPR implementation; the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (CERD Committee),
which monitors CERD implementation; and the U.N. Special Rapporteur
on Racism. Japan's response to the various findings and recommendations of these bodies balances out the discussion.
Before taking up this conversation, I must first touch on Japan's
treatment of international law. Historically, Japan has shown great deference to international law, and generally grants international treaties the
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force of domestic law.'97 Scholars advocate the theory that international
treaties have domestic force of law in Japan.'"8 Judges, however, are far
more circumscribed in their application of international treaties. Before
applying international law, judges first weigh the precision of a treaty's
terms, the context in which it is invoked, and the extent to which domestic law already covers the particular area.'99
But, apart from its attitude toward international law, what substantive obligations has Japan assumed through acceding to international
human rights instruments? By 1980, Japan had signed only two of the
major international human rights conventions; 200 some considered this a
reflection of insincere commitment to human rights.'
To staunch such criticisms, and to boost its international reputation-and perhaps to land a permanent seat on the U.N. Security
Council-Japan has significantly changed its tune.2 2 By 1999, Japan had
ratified such important human rights instruments as the Convention
Against Torture,2 °3 the Convention on the Rights of the Child,2 °' and, cru-

cial to this discussion, the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms
of Racial Discrimination. 25
Somewhat less impressive has been Japan's embrace of ethnic and
racial diversity. At present, despite a decade of calls from U.N. bodies,
domestic non-governmental organizations, and scholars, Japan has not
passed a law to ban private acts of racial discrimination. In the past ten
years, Japanese courts have filled in the legislative gap by compensating
foreign plaintiffs who sue for racial discrimination. In handing down

197.

See, e.g., Yuji

IWASAWA,

INTERNATIONAL LAW, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND JAPANESE

28 (1998); Kenneth L. Port,
The Japanese InternationalLaw "Revolution ": InternationalHuman Rights Law and Its Impact in Japan, 28 STAN. J. INT'L L. 139, 152-53 (1992).
198.
Port, supra note 197, at 153.
199.
IWASAWA, supra note 197, at 47-48.
200.
Japan had ratified only two international human rights treaties by 1980. It ratified
additional instruments in the 1980s and 1990s. See Univ. of Minn., Ratification of Human
Rights Treaties-Japan, http://wwwl.umn.edu/humanrts/research/ratification-japan.html (last
visited Dec. 28, 2008).
201.
NEARY, supra note 40, at 50.
202.
Id. at 49 ("There was a qualitative change in the Japanese approach to human rights
in the 1990s....").
203.
Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment, Dec. 10, 1984, S. TREATY Doc. No. 100-20 (1988), 1465 U.N.T.S. 85.
204.
Convention on the Rights of the Child, Nov. 20, 1989, 1577 U.N.T.S. 3.
205.
CERD, supra note 37; see also U.N. HIGH COMM'R ON HUMAN RIGHTS, STATUS OF
RATIFICATIONS OF THE PRINCIPAL INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS TREATIES 6 (June 9,
LAW: THE IMPACT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW ON JAPANESE LAW

2004), available at http://www.unhchr.ch/pdf/report.pdf (listing the dates of Japan's ratifica-

tion of major human rights instruments).
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verdicts, Japanese courts have often cited to international human rights
law, such as CERD and the ICCPR.2l
When it comes to applying international human rights law, courts
routinely hold that international treaties "are not intended to be directly
applied to legal relations between private individuals, but are to be indirectly applied through provisions contained in specific substantive
private law.' 20 7 As the discussion in Part II suggests, Japanese courts have
repeatedly imported the normative pith of international law through
Japanese tort law. However, this approach remains an unfinished project.
As the following discussion makes clear, a number of unanswered problems still lingers.
A. Human Rights Committee Reports

When Japan ratified the ICCPR in 1979, it undertook a duty to submit periodic compliance reports to the Covenant's Human Rights
Committee (HRC).208 To date, Japan has submitted five such reports. 2u09
In June 1997, Japan submitted its fourth report,20 which the HRC considered in October 1998; Japan submitted its fifth report in December
2006, although the HRC has yet to issue its findings on this report.2 ' As
with all States' reports, Japan's compliance reports tend to portray domestic events in the best possible light. Consequently, while due
attention is paid to the responses articulated in Japan's 2006 Report, the
212
emphasis here is on the HRC's more objective observations.
Three of the HRC's concerns are particularly germane to the present discussion: (1) "the lack of institutional mechanisms available for
See, e.g., supra Part II.
IWASAWA, supra note 197, at 91 (quoting 1468 HANREI JIHO 122, 129-30 (Osaka D.
Ct., June 18, 1993)).
208.
ICCPR, supra note 68 (ratified by Japan on Sept. 21, 1979). Article 40(l)(b) requires States to submit compliance reports "whenever the Committee so requests." Id. art.
41(l)(b).
209.
See, e.g., MOFA, Fifth Periodic Report by the Government of Japan Under Article
40 Paragraph1(b) of the International Covenant on Civil and PoliticalRights (2006), available at http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/human/civil-rep6.pdf [hereinafter Fifth Periodic
Report]; MOFA, Fourth Periodic Report by the Government of Japan Under Article 40 Paragraph 1(b) of the InternationalCovenant on Civil and Political Rights (1997), available at
http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/human/civil-rep4/index.html [hereinafter Fourth Periodic Report].
210.
See Fourth Periodic Report, supra note 209.
211.
See U.N. High Comm'r on Human Rights, Human Rights Comm., Fifth Periodic
Reports of States Parties Due in 2002: Japan, U.N. Doc. CCPRIC/JPN/5 (Apr. 25, 2007). It
should be noted that Japan submitted this report well after the 2002 deadline.
212.
See U.N. High Comm'r on Human Rights, Human Rights Comm., Concluding
Observationsof the Human Rights Committee, Japan, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/79/Add.102 (Nov.
19, 1998), available at http://wwwl.umn.edu/humanrts/ hrcommittee/japan I998.html [hereinafter 1998 HRC Report].
206.

207.
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investigating violations of human rights and for providing redress to
the complainants"; 2 3 (2) the elasticity of the concept of "reasonable

discrimination";2 4 and (3) the Japanese judiciary's lack of expertise in
human rights law.21 5
First, the HRC commended Japan's establishment of a Civil Liberties Commission. 216 However, HRC went on to note that the Commission
had been set up under the Japanese Ministry of Justice and limited to
issuing recommendations. 2 7 This led the HRC to recommend that Japan
establish an "independent mechanism" to investigate human rights violations. 218 Similarly, the Ministry of Justice has also set up numerous
Human Rights Counseling Offices for Foreigners throughout Japan.2 9
But, like the Civil Liberties Commission, these entities are understaffed,
ineffectual, and limited in authority. They can request, but not compel, a
discriminator to halt his conduct. 220 Without more forceful procedures in
its arsenal-the competence to impose fines or demand apologiesneither the commission nor the establishment of counseling offices is
likely to alter the racial attitudes of discriminating Japanese.
In its 2006 report, the Government of Japan responded to some of
these concerns. First, Japan stated that the counseling offices have "respond[ed] to various human rights inquiries from foreign nationals,2 2 '
such as "being refused rental of an apartment or being refused entry to a
restaurant or public bath. 222 This may seem encouraging, as it shows that
the Japanese government is responding to the incidents discussed above.

213.
Id. para. 9.
214.
Id. para. 11.
215.
Id. para. 32.
216.
Id. para. 3.
217.
Id. para. 9.
218.
Id.
219.
See MOJ, Human Rights Counseling Offices for Foreigners (2006),
http://www.moj.go.jp/ENGLISH/information/hrcf-01.html (last visited Dec. 28, 2008) (listing
representative offices).
220.
See, e.g., 1998 HRC Report, supra note 212; U.N. High Comm'r on Human Rights,
Comm. on Elimination of Racial Discrimination, Concluding Observations of the Comm. for
the Elimination of Racial Discrimination:Japan, U.N. Doc. CERD/C/304/Add. 114 (Apr. 27.
2001); U.N. High Comrnm'r on Human Rights, Comm. on Elimination of Racial Discrimination, Report of the Comm. on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, paras. 159-85, U.N.
Doc. A/56/18 (Jan. 10, 2001); U.N. High Comm'r on Human Rights, Comm. on Elimination
of Racial Discrimination, Second Periodic Reports of States PartiesDue in 1999, Addendum:
Japan, U.N. Doc. CERD/C/350/Add.2 (Sept. 26, 2000); MOFA, Comments of the Japanese
Government on the Concluding Observations Adopted by the Comm. on the Elimination of
Racial Discriminationon March 20, 2000 [sic], Regarding the Initial and Second Periodic
Report of the Japanese Government (Oct. 2001), available at http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/
human/commentO II0.html.
221.
See Fifth Periodic Report, supra note 209, para. 50.
222.
Id. para. 48.
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But the government's relatively lackluster response dims any hope
that these problems will be taken seriously. The Report simply notes that
the Ministry of Justice is "aiming to remedy and prevent harm caused by
human rights infringements through human rights counseling and investigation and resolution of human rights infringement cases. ' 2 3 This
amounts to a fairly weak stance. First, aiming to remedy a problem is not
the same as fixing it. Second, counseling and investigation are not strong
enough mechanisms to prevent racial discrimination. Punishment or injunction, or preferably both, would signal that Japan is more serious
about its international human rights commitments.
Second, the HRC expressed concern about the vagueness of "reasonable discrimination., 224 Indeed, this is the very problem faced by
several of the plaintiffs above.225 Without providing guidance as to what
discrimination is reasonable, Japan in effect sanctions various forms of
discrimination. No one would doubt that some amount of discrimination
is unavoidable. As discussed above in the Shukert and Herman cases,
Japanese sports leagues and businesses may legally discriminate against
foreigners in limited contexts. Provided defendants articulate a reason in
good faith, courts have deferred to the exclusionary preferences of Japa226
nese corporations and organizations.
However, is it reasonable to deny foreigners membership in a golf
club? What social benefit is promoted by such exclusions? And could the
standard of reasonability not be more clearly delineated? Many Japanese-including the defendants in Bortz and McGowan-thought that
they had the right to discriminate against foreigners, a misconception
buttressed by police activity and politicians' rants. Interestingly, the
Japanese government's 2006 Report does not address the concept of reasonable discrimination. Nevertheless, direction on this topic would help
to delineate "permissible" discrimination, while signaling that discrimination itself is, in most situations, illegal.
Third, the HRC noted that Japanese judges, prosecutors, and administrative officers are not sufficiently trained in human rights law. To
compensate for this inadequacy, "U]udicial colloquiums and seminars
should be held to familiarize judges with the provisions of the Covenant. ' 227 This recommendation is well founded based on the case law
discussed above. At one extreme, the Bortz opinion demonstrates one
judge's complete fluency with the discourse of international human
rights; the judge traced the history of human rights from Confucius to
223.
224.
225.
226.
227.

Fifth PeriodicReport, supra note 209, para. 49.
1998 HRC Report, supra note 212, para. 11.
See supra notes 93-107 and accompanying text.
See supra Part lI.B.
1998 HRC Report, supra note 212, para. 32.
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Nietzsche.228 But, at the other extreme, the McGowan opinion either ignores, or turns an indifferent ear to, the past few decades of human rights
developments. In any event, additional training certainly would not hurt.
The Japanese government specifically addressed this concern in its
2006 Report. Judges, both experienced and newly appointed, were expected to attend "lectures on such themes as international human rights
covenants, international human rights and foreign nationals' human
rights. 229 Moreover, Japan's 2006 report also noted that judges receive
training in international
S 230 human rights law while at the Legal Training
and Research Institute. In light of the many fields of law about which
Japanese judges are expected to be knowledgeable, ongoing education
seems an adequate response.
B. CERD Committee Report

In June 1999, Japan submitted a combined first and second report
(1999 CERD Report) to the CERD Committee. 23 'The Committee issued
two responses: a summary record of its March 2001 meeting with Japanese delegates • (Summary
more formal set of
" 1 •
233 Record), 112 and a
Concluding Observations. In October 2001, in order to clarify certain
questions posed in the Committee's findings, the Government of Japan
published its own reply (GOJ Reply).23 Japan has yet to submit a second
report, although the Committee had requested that Japan submit its next
report by January 14, 2003.233 Two related themes emerge from the
Committee's reports: the status of CERD in Japan's domestic legal order,
and whether Japan will pass an anti-discrimination law.

228.
See Bortz v. Suzuki, 1045 HANREI TAIMUZU 216 (Shizuoka D. Ct., Oct. 12, 1999);
Webster, Bortz v. Suzuki, supra note 41.
229.
Fifth PeriodicReport, supra note 209, para. 29.
230.
Id. para. 30.
231.
MOFA, International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (Firstand Second Report), U.N. Doc. CERD/C/350/Add.2 (June 1999), available
at http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/human/race-repl/index.html [hereinafter 1999 CERD Report].
232.
Comm. on Elimination of Racial Discrimination, Summary Record of the 1444th
Meeting: Japan, U.N. Doc. CERD/C/SR. 1444 (June 11, 2001) [hereinafter Summary Record].
233.
Comm. on Elimination of Racial Discrimination, Concluding Observations of the
Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination: Japan, U.N. Doc. CERD/C/304/
Add.I 14 (Apr. 27, 2001) [hereinafter Concluding Observations].
234.
MOFA, Comments of the Japanese Government on the Concluding Observations
Adopted by the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discriminationon March 20, 2000
Regarding Initial and Second Report of the JapaneseGovernment, 4(1) (2001), available at
http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/human/commentO II0.html [hereinafter GOJ Reply].
235.
Concluding Observations, supra note 233, para. 27.
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1. CERD in the Domestic Legal Order
In the 1999 CERD Report, the Japanese government succinctly
summarized the status of CERD within the domestic legal order:
Provisions of treaties concluded by Japan have legal effect as a
part of domestic laws in accordance with ... the Constitution
.... Whether or not to apply provisions of the conventions di-

rectly is judged in each specific case, taking into consideration
the purpose, meaning and wording of the provisions concerned.236

Japan's adherence to CERD is essentially ad hoc, dependent on the
vagaries of the case and (we expect) the judge. This approach to international law is, to some extent, expected, for contextualization--examining
existing provisions, case law, local conditions, and so on-is always part
of applying law, domestic or international. But, by postponing the decision of whether to apply CERD to the actual contours of the case, courts
fail to give the treaty due consideration and may overlook international
legal commitments.
In its Summary Record, the CERD Committee requested further
clarification of CERD's domestic legal effect. The Japanese delegate
explained that "international treaties did not establish the rights of individuals directly but laid down obligations which were binding on the
' This, of course, is the classic
States that had ratified them."237
view of
international law: a set of obligations that binds States, but does not empower individuals to sue in the absence of additional implementing
legislation."' But, without implementing legislation, individuals have no
legal recourse to counter acts of racial discrimination.
This lacuna was not lost on the CERD Committee members, one of
whom noted that "the Convention's provisions were not self-executing in
Japanese law. Since national legislation had to be adopted to implement
the Convention, it was all the more necessary to enact appropriate legislation to criminalize all acts of racial discrimination"" This may have
overstated the problem, as criminalizing racist acts is hardly the only
way to legislate against them. Nevertheless, the suggestion was unmistakable: Japan should domesticate this critical principle of international
law by enacting some kind of implementing legislation.

236.
1999 CERD Report, supra note 23 1, para. 5 (emphasis added).
237.
Summary Record, supra note 232, para. 5.
238.
The delegate explained that "the Convention required States parties to adopt legislative, judicial, administrative or other measures which gave effect to the provisions of the
Convention, but did not consider that the Convention could be directly invoked." Id.
239.
Id. para. 35.
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A related concern of the Committee involved the paucity of court
decisions that reference CERD. While the analysis in Part II challenges
this assessment-numerous courts have applied CERD since the Committee issued its report-the government's response is still quite telling.
The Japanese government apparently feared that a court would apply
international law before making the necessary factual determinations.24
In other words, attending to international law might somehow predispose
courts to impute racial discrimination to an actor who did not act with
racially discriminatory intent.
Of course, as we have seen, such concerns did not deter the Osaka
District Court from handing down the McGowan decision.24' Instead, the
judge brushed aside McGowan's evidence of racist conduct by dismissing McGowan's linguistic skills. Yet, the other cases discussed above in
Part II.A suggest that a majority of Japanese courts can both apply international legal standards and attend to making correct factual
determinations at the same time.
2. Prospects for a New Law
What are the prospects that Japan will pass a law banning racial discrimination in the private sphere? At this point, they appear slim, as
Japan denies that such laws are necessary: "We do not recognize that the
present situation of Japan is one in which discriminative acts cannot be
effectively restrained by the existing legal system and in which explicit
racial discriminative acts, which cannot be treated by measures other
than legislation, are conducted.2 4 2
As a matter of policy, the Government of Japan has a point: the
Japanese judiciary has proven to be a bulwark against racial discrimination. However, not every judge is inclined to thread international treaty
law through the eye of domestic tort. Nor will every victim of racial discrimination file a lawsuit. Japanese courts' mantra that CERD may serve
as an "interpretative standard"2 43 in the indirect application of international law is a helpful beginning. But Japan cannot overlook another of
CERD's important provisions: to pass appropriate legislation.2

240.
In the somewhat garbled language of the GOJ Reply, "There is a constraint that
applying law by the court premises a fact authorized by the court based on facts claimed or
evidence submitted by the parties concerned." GOJ Reply, supra note 234, 4(1).
241.
McGowan v. Narita, Wa No. 11926 (Osaka D. Ct., Jan. 30, 2006); Webster,
McGowan v. Narita, supra note 27.
242.
GOJ Reply, supra note 234, 5(1).
243.
See, e.g., Webster, Bortz v. Suzuki, supra note 41, at 652; Webster, Arudou v. Earth
Cure, supra note 60, at 317.
244.
CERD, supra note 37, art. 2(l)(d).
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The Japanese government is on thinner ice when it states that a law
banning private acts of racial discrimination is unnecessary "[s]ince the
purport of the Convention has already been reflected in the provision of
domestic law.'214 It is not clear which "provision" the government has in
mind, as no Japanese law bans private acts of racial discrimination. Article 14 of the Japanese Constitution does provide a normative standard,2 6
but its limitation to public bodies renders it ineffective in the private
sphere.
C. Report of the U.N. Special Rapporteur
In 1993, the U.N. Commission on Human Rights established the position of Special Rapporteur on Racism to examine contemporary forms
of racism and devise measures to overcome them.2 " The current Rapporteur, Doudou Diane of Senegal, conducted a mission to Japan in July
2005. His 2006 report caused waves when he concluded that racism in
Japan was "deep and profound. '' 248 Although the report focuses on a
wider swath of conduct than contemplated by this Essay, the report's
constant refrain-that Japan must pass a law to ban racial discrimination
and provide compensation-fits comfortably into the present discussion.
The report references several of the lawsuits discussed above, including Bortz, Arudou, and Hyon J.249 The report also took several Japanese
actors to task. First, the absence of a national law had created an environment in which "racial discrimination is practised undisturbed.' 250 Second,
since public authorities never prosecuted discriminators, a culture of impunity had formed in various sectors of Japanese society.' Third, the
report singled out the Otaru Assembly-although any local government
would have sufficed 252-for failing to pass a local ordinance in the
245.
GOJ Reply, supra note 234, $ 5(1).
246.
See supra note 67.
247.
Comm'n on Hum. Rts. [CHR], Res. 1993/20, 10, U.N. Doc. E/CN 4/RES/1993/20
(Mar. 2, 1993).
248.
See UN Envoy Urges Japan to Adopt Anti-Discrimination Legislation, VOICE OF
AM. NEWS, May 18, 2006, available at http://www.voanews.com/english/2006-05-18voa6.cfm.
249.
See U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council [ECOSOC], Racism, Racial Discrimination,Xenophobia and All Forms of Discrimination:Report of the Special Rapporteuron Contemporary
Forms of Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related Intolerance: Mission to
Japan, [ 63, 65, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2006/16Add.2 (Jan. 24, 2006) (prepared by Doudou
Diane) [hereinafter Diane Report].

250.

Id. 164.

251.
Id.
252.
See Tottori PrefecturalAssembly Approves Rights Ordinance, DAILY YOMIURI, Oct.
12, 2005, at 2 (noting that the "Tottori Prefectural Assembly ... approved the nation's first
ordinance protecting human rights"). But see Tottori Approves Bill Nixing Disputed Human
Rights Ordinance, JAPAN ECON. NEWSWIRE PLUS, Mar. 24, 2006 (noting the same ordinance
was ultimately rescinded).
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Arudou decision. The Rapporteur specifically recommended that the Assembly pass criminal ordinances, so as to "allow the authorities under
the local jurisdiction to prosecute such offences. ' 253
The Rapporteur also reacted to the Hyon I decision, in which the Tokyo District Court held that a golf club could discriminate against a
resident Korean because it was a private entity.2 4 This led to another
broadside against the Japanese judiciary: "[I]t appears that the Japanese
system is not one in which discriminatory acts can effectively be restrained by the existing legal system. ' As I have argued, the Hyon I
decision was decided incorrectly. However, the analysis in Part IL.A
shows that the Japanese judiciary often takes a strong stance against racial discrimination. Despite occasional-and significant-lapses, the
legal system has been the strongest transmitter of anti-discrimination
norms in Japan. The problem is that the judiciary cannot pass laws, a
responsibility that falls to the legislature.
At the end of his report, Diane provided a number of recommendations. Significant for our purposes were the several paragraphs
advocating "the adoption of a national law against racism, discrimination
and xenophobia. '25 6 More concretely, the report recommended that the
law penalize racial discrimination in all of its forms, particularly in the
fields of "employment, housing and marriage," while guaranteeing "access to effective
protection and remedies, including compensation, to
'7
25

victims.

The United Nations, in its various manifestations, thus offers a
unique lens on the way in which the Japanese government views itself.
In meetings, conferences, and reports, the United Nations has consistently expressed concern about the Japanese treatment of ethnic others. It
has also repeatedly urged Japan to pass a law outlawing racial slurs.258
This proposed-and failed-legislation remains the final topic for discussion.
IV. THE

WAY FORWARD

Japan's judiciary has admirably imported the norms of international
human rights law into Japanese jurisprudence. But courts can only do so
much, namely, resolve disputes between private individuals or entities.
253.
254.
255.
256.
257.
258.

Id.
Diane Report, supra note 249, 65.
Id.
Id. T 76.
Id.
See infra notes 261-262 and accompanying text.
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At the present moment, the problem in Japan lies in insufficient internalization of anti-discriminatory norms. Without changing its domestic
laws, as Japan did on ratifying the Convention on the Elimination of All
Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW),2 9 international human rights law will only obliquely touch Japanese society. Moreover,
when it does, the effect will be isolated, localized, and transient.
The current system in Japan does not undertake one very basic tool
of combating racism: proscription. By not passing a law to ban private
acts of racial discrimination, the Japanese Diet has effectively inoculated
Japanese citizens from reconciling their attitudes, understanding, and
behaviors to global norms. The fact that Japanese legislators-local and
national-have deliberated laws to ban racial discrimination is encouraging at first blush. However, after repeated discussions and no laws, one
must question why they hesitated.
A. NationalLegislation
To its credit, the Diet has debated a Human Rights Protection Bill.
Since 2002, the Diet has discussed a bill that would address a wide array
of human rights abuses, including discrimination. 2 Germane to the
present discussion is Article 3 of this draft bill, and its proscription of
racial discrimination by (1) local or national officials; (2) real estate
agents, and providers of goods and services; and (3) employers. 261 Article
3 also outlaws insults, harassment, or "other words and deeds" of unjust
discrimination based on race.262 Although one could certainly criticize
the elasticity and expansiveness of the law, it is beyond cavil that the bill
represents a significant step in the right direction.
The proposed bill would
entrust the investigation of violations to a
Human Rights Comsin
Commission. 263 Th
The saeCmmsinwol6lo3one
same Commission would also counsel
259.

Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women,

Dec. 18, 1979, 1249 U.N.T.S. 13 [hereinafter CEDAW]. To accord with CEDAW, Japan revised its domestic legislation in the areas of nationality, employment, and education. See
generally Yuji Iwasawa, The Impact of International Human Rights Law on Japanese Law:
The Third Reformationfor Japanese Women, 34 JAPANESE ANN. INT'L L. 21,39 (1991).
260.
Jinken y6go h6an [Human Rights Protection Bill], Diet Sess. 154, Bill No. 56 of
2002, available at http://www.jca.apc.org/jhrf2l/eng/hrpb.html [hereinafter Human Rights
Protection Bill]; see also Legislation to Stop Human Rights Abuses Is an Urgent Need, ASAHI
SHIMBUN, July 29, 2005 (on file with author) (noting that the ruling party abandoned its plan
to submit a human rights protection bill in 2005); LDP Forgoes Immediate Diet Submission of
Human Rights Bill, KyoDo NEWS INT'L, May 16, 2005 (on file with author) (noting that the

government had submitted a similar bill to the Diet in 2002, but that the bill failed due to concerns about "freedom of expression and a clause barring the media from excessive coverage of
individuals").

261.
262.
263.

Human Rights Protection Bill, supra note 260, art. 3.
Id.
Id. art. 28.
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victims; provide guidance to perpetrators; and initiate mediation, arbitration, or litigation in the most serious instances. 264 It would not be able to
enjoin acts of discrimination, although it could initiate a lawsuit to obtain a court injunction. 265
Critics have noted three problems with the proposed bill. First, the
Commission would be housed in the Ministry of Justice, essentially obviating independent investigations of human rights abuses in prisons or
detention centers, which are both run by that ministry.2 Second, the media expressed concern regarding limits on their powers to disseminate
information about victims, family members, and others connected to the
incident.2 67 But the third criticism is perhaps the most surprising.
The proposed bill also would allow for qualified people (including,
presumably, foreign nationals) with high moral integrity, and the appro261
priate experience in law or society to serve on an individual commission.
Commissioners investigate violations, raise awareness of human rights,
and make advisory (nonbinding) recommendations to local commissions.2 69 Since many human rights abuses are directed at foreigners, it
makes sense for foreign nationals to serve as commissioners. And, since
local governments appoint the commissioners after consulting the local
bar and other human rights organizations,27 ° there is little chance of
nominating a "rogue" commissioner.
Nevertheless, the Liberal Democratic Party-Japan's largest and
strongest political party-refused to endorse the bill out of fear that foreign residents could serve as commissioners. The Liberal Democratic
Party feared that such foreign commissioners might "give preferential
treatment" to citizens of certain countries, perhaps the most concerning
of which was North Korea. Most of the maximum 20,000 commission
positions would, of course, be filled by Japanese citizens. However, the
possibility of a foreigner monitoring human rights abuses proved too
controversial for the ruling party. Having twice failed to make it through
the Diet, the Human Rights Protection Bill stands a remote chance of

Id. arts. 41,45, 60.
264.
Id. art. 65.
265.
See Legislation to Stop Human Rights Abuses Is an Urgent Need, supra note 260.
266.
Id.; See Human Rights Protection Bill, supra note 260, art. 42(d) (placing minor
267.
restrictions on the press: journalists could not stalk, lie in wait, block, or repeatedly phone a
person connected to the investigation, nor could they "unreasonably report[]" on the facts of
someone's private life).
Human Rights Protection Bill, supra note 260, art. 9(1).
268.
269.
Id. art. 6.
270.
Id. art. 22(3).
See LDP Forgoes Immediate Diet Submission of Human Rights Bill, supra note
271.
260.
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becoming law. It does, however, represent committed if cautious progress toward realizing international human rights norms in Japan.
B. Local Legislation
To fill the void present at the national level, local governments have
conducted their own legislative experiments. In October 2005, for instance, the Tottori Prefectural Assembly passed an ordinance that banned
racial discrimination, among other social ills, such as sexual harassment,
physical abuse, and slander. Surprisingly, and rarely for a local ordinance, the Assembly indefinitely suspended the ordinance in March
2006, citing problems with the vagueness of the term "human rights violation" and concerns about media restrictions. 73
The proposed ordinance had some teeth, albeit not especially sharp
ones. A Human Rights Committee could have investigated allegations,
and could have advised the violator to stop the discriminatory conduct. 274
If the violator refused, he could have faced fines of up to 50,000 yen
($500), and public disclosure of his name. 7 The ordinance was considerably softer on administrative organizations, which could "refuse to
cooperate" with the commissioner if the head of the organization so decided. 76
Although it was a step in the right direction, the Tottori ordinance
failed to win the support of many. Not least among its detractors was the
legal community. Legal scholars found it either unjustifiable in light of
Tottori's particular circumstances, or contrary to certain fundamental
freedoms: those of expression, thought, and the press.277 The Tottori Bar
Association, pointing to the authorities' discretion in deciding whether to
disclose the names of violators, objected to the ordinance's "arbitrary
nature. 278 Consequently,
the Bar stated that it would not cooperate with
•
279
the ordinance.

272.
273.
274.

Tottori Approves Bill Nixing Disputed Human Rights Ordinance,supra note 252.
Id.
Japan's Tottori First Prefecture to Pass Human Rights Bill, BBC INT'L REPORTS
(ASIA), Oct. 12, 2005.
275.
Id.
276.
Totori Approves Bill Nixing Disputed Human Rights Ordinance,supra note 252.
277.
Id.
278.
Tottori Government to Halt Implementation of Human Rights Ordinance, JAPAN
ECON. NEWSWIRE PLus, Feb. 24, 2006.
279.
TattoriApproves Bill Nixing Disputed Human Rights Ordinance,supra note 252.
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CONCLUSION

It is unlikely that Japan will pass a law that bans racial discrimination in the near future. Two attempts in the national legislature, and an
aborted attempt in a local government, reveal that Japanese lawmakers
are not serious about solving the problem of racial discrimination. Perhaps they do not need to: foreigners continue to arrive in Japan in
increasing numbers. Furthermore, why would Japan want to protect people who are, by and large, neither nationals nor long-term prospects for
citizenship?
At the same time, the enhanced role of the Japanese judiciary is worthy of attention and praise. Judges have grappled with the legislative
failure in creative ways, interpreting domestic law through the lens of
Japan's recently assumed international legal obligations. While this
represents progress toward "eliminating" racial discrimination, it also
raises questions about proper notice-e.g., how would a Japanese person
know racial discrimination is illegal-and ultimately the domestication
of international legal norms. Courts are important, even necessary, conduits for this process. But they cannot do it alone.

